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I. Introduction 
The use of national security language to create and defend 
immigration law and policy is historic.1 The Immigration and 
                                                                                                     
  Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and Clinical Professor of Law, Founding 
Director, Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, Penn State Law-University Park; 
Author of BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
IMMIGRATION CASES. The author thanks Peter Margulies and Fatma Marouf for their 
feedback and is grateful to Casey Millburg and the editorial staff of the Washington 
& Lee Law Review for their superb editorial assistance. The contents of this article 
are drawn from and build upon remarks delivered on February 2 in connection with 
the Lara D. Gass Symposium at Washington & Lee School of Law’s symposium: 
President Trump's Executive Orders and Emergent Issues in Immigration; and 
various blog posts on Medium https://medium.com/@shobawadhia and the American 
Constitution Society, https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/all/shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia.  
 1. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A) (2012) 
(discussing the national security needs in relation to immigration law, policies, and 
procedures). For a look at how national security has been used to discuss immigration 
control, see generally Jennifer M. Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration 
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, 66 EMORY 
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Nationality Act (INA), which Congress enacted in 1952, contains 
sections to exclude or deport noncitizens for “security and related 
grounds.”2 A sublayer of this section is aimed at noncitizens who 
engage in “any other criminal activity which endangers the public 
safety or national security . . . .”3 The Executive Branch has 
published regulations and policies that use national security 
language in a similar manner. Federal courts have further upheld 
immigration laws or deferred to Congress or agencies in the name 
of national security.4 One tool that has enabled the cohabitation of 
national security and immigration is the “plenary power doctrine,” 
which originates from a case known as Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States5 (alternately, the Chinese Exclusion Case) and refers to the 
complete power “political branches” have over immigration.6 As 
administrative and immigration law scholar Michael Kagan has 
described, “[h]aving chosen an extra-constitutional foundation for 
immigration law, the Court quickly came to the conclusion that the 
judiciary had little or no role in reviewing decisions prohibiting 
foreigners from entering the country . . . .”7 The practical impact is 
that legal questions noncitizens raise regarding entry or rights in 
the United States are limited. Indeed, when the plenary power 
doctrine is invoked, the courts will not intervene.8  
The outer limits of the plenary power doctrine have also been 
tested in the courts and recently in connection with the Muslim 
                                                                                                     
L.J. 669 (2007).  
 2. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1182(a)(3), 1227(a)(4). 
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(ii).  
 4. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604–05 (1889) 
(noting Congress’ and the executive branch’s roles in conducting foreign 
relations); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion 
Cases: The Plenary Power Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 
ASIAN AM. L.J. 13, 15 (2003) (discussing doctrines of international law 
enforcement in the U.S., including deference to Congress and the executive 
branch).  
 5. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 6. Id. at 604–05 (1889) (explaining Congress’ and the executive’s power over 
international affairs). 
 7. Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 23 (2015). 
 8. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604–608 (reflecting the 
Court’s decision to not interfere in questions of international affairs); Saito, supra 
note 4, at 15 (noting judiciary hesitation to interfere with the political branches’ 
power over national security). 
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bans the Executive Branch has issued against noncitizens based 
upon their nationality and religion.9 While it is simple to identify 
the use of national security language by Congress, the executive 
branch and courts, measuring the national security value of a 
particular immigration law or policy is a greater challenge. 
Moreover, when governments are permitted to create immigration 
policies under a national security justification that is never tested, 
or, even worse, found to be flawed, the human consequences are 
grave. For example, the former Immigration and Naturalization 
Service published a regulation known as “special registration” on 
the heels of an announcement by then-Attorney General John 
Ashcroft to track and interrogate certain individuals through a 
“National Security Entry and Exit Registration System” 
(“NSEERS”).10 With the NSEERS program, nearly 14,000 men 
from primarily Muslim countries were placed in removal 
(deportation) proceedings after coming forward to register with the 
government.11 Former government officials responsible for 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (noting that the Judicial 
Branch normally “must defer to the Executive and Legislative Branch” on 
immigration, but Congress’ “plenary power” over creating immigration law is 
“subject to important constitutional limitations.”); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
941 (1983) (stating that Congress and the Executive must “cho[ose] a 
constitutionally permissible means of implementing” their authority over 
immigration). “These cases instruct that the political branches’ power over 
immigration is not tantamount to a constitutional blank check, and that vigorous 
judicial review is required when an immigration action’s constitutionality is in 
question.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 590 (4th Cir. 
2017); see also Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the 
political branches’ powers in conducting foreign and national security affairs); 
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting the 
judiciary’s deference to the political branches in matters of national security and 
territorial sovereignty); Complaint, Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump, 
No. 8:17-cd-02921-GJH (D. Md. Oct. 2, 2017), (alleging several times that the 
executive order in question is impermissibly based on nationality and religion); 
Zakzok v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02969-GLR (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2017) (same); Exec. 
Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (same); Exec. Order No. 
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (same). 
 10. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft 
Announces Implementation of the First Phase of the National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System (Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 11. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, NSEERS or “Muslim” Registration Was a 
Failed Post 9-11 Program and Must Come to an End, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@shobawadhia/nseers-or-muslim-registration-was-a-failed-
post-9-11-program-and-must-come-to-an-end-1200469bf64b (last visited Sept. 18, 
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administering the NSEERS program and national security experts 
concluded that NSEERS was a huge waste of resources and 
without national security benefit.12 Nonetheless, the fallout of the 
program fell on the men who came forward and were later detained 
and deported, as well as on their families.13 The use of national 
security to create or defend immigration law or policy also raises a 
number of constitutional concerns, some of which the courts have 
addressed in connection with the plenary power doctrine and, more 
recently, the appellate courts have addressed in reviewing the 
Muslim bans in connection with the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.14 
Beyond the Muslim Bans are increased use of existing tools 
and the creation of new policies by the administration that 
effectively operate to restrict certain nationals from entering the 
United States or what I sometimes refer to as “backdoor bans.”15 
                                                                                                     
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ed Pilkington, Muslims 
to March on White House in Bid to Dismantle Discriminatory Registry, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/12/american-
muslims-march-white-house-nseers (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 12. For a discussion of the opposition from domestic and foreign government 
officials, including former General Counsel David Martin; former INS 
Commissioner James Ziglar; former Commissioner of the Customs and Border 
Protection agency at the Dept. of Homeland Security Robert Bonner; and Edward 
Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, see Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception, 
114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485, 1521–22 (2010) (discussing the Council on Foreign 
Relations’, Government Accountability Office’s, and ex-government officials’ and 
watchdogs’ view that the NSEERS program was without much benefit).  
 13. See id. at 1503–11 (discussing the impact that Post 9/11 policies had on 
immigrant families); Wadhia, supra note 11 (providing a list of resources that 
provide discussions of the individuals impacted by NSEERS); see also End the 
Shame of NSEERS, AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., http://www.adc.org/ 
legal/end-the-shame-of-nseers/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the large 
number of Arabs and Muslims ultimately deported for complying with the 
NSEERS program without having been charged with terrorism) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 14. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(discussing the likelihood of success of an Establishment Clause claim); Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 590 (4th Cir. 2017) (same). 
 15. See Sandra Bruno, U.S. Visa Applications: Extreme Vetting and the 
221(g) Process, NAT’L L. REV. (May 18, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/u-s-visa-applications-extreme-vetting-and-221g-process (last visited Sept. 
18, 2018) (discussing immigration policy requiring additional information, 
documents, or background checks to determine visa eligibility beyond a typical 
NATIONAL SECURITY, IMMIGRATION 1479 
President Trump coined the phrase “extreme vetting” at various 
points of his tenure and also before he assumed office, but the term 
has not been used consistently by the administration.16 The term 
“extreme vetting” gained renewed attention following a terror 
attack by a motorist in New York City that killed eight people and 
injured several more; President Trump tweeted “I have just 
ordered Homeland Security to step up our already Extreme 
Vetting Program. Being politically correct is fine, but not for 
this!”17 In an interview with FOX News, former Secretary of 
Homeland Security John Kelly explained, “[e]xtreme vetting is, we 
simply interview people and have to satisfy ourselves that the 
person we’re talking to is indeed the person who they claim.”18 
White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders outlined 
extreme vetting as including extra collection and review of 
biometric and biographical data; improved documentation 
requirements and verification; heightened scrutiny and review by 
Customs and Border Protection and related agencies; and 
improved information sharing, among other items.19 On their face, 
these measures are reasonable, but in reality the immigration 
system has a number of screening procedures that use similar 
                                                                                                     
consular interview) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 16. See, e.g., Joseph Tanfani, What Donald Trump Means When He Opposes 
“Extreme Vetting” for Would-Be Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-extreme-vetting-20160816-
snap-htmlstory.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing Donald Trump’s use 
of the phrase “extreme vetting” and explaining the extreme vetting proposal) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lauren Said-Moorhouse & Ryan 
Browne, Donald Trump Wants “Extreme Vetting” of Immigrants. What Is the US 
Doing Now?, CNN (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/16/politics/how-
us-vets-immigrants-donald-trump-extreme-vetting/index.html (last visited Sept. 
18, 2018) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 17. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 31, 2017, 6:26 
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/925534445393928199?lang=en 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 18. Philip Rucker, Trump Says He Ordered U.S. to “Step Up Our Already 
Extreme Vetting Program”, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/10/31/trump-says-
he-ordered-u-s-to-step-up-our-already-extreme-vetting 
program/?utm_term=.e81f2cb80769 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. Blair Guild, What Is Extreme Vetting? White House Outlines Proposed 
Immigration Policy, CBS NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017, 7:47 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-extreme-vetting/ (last visited Sept. 18, 
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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terms and involve similar government agencies. A Brennan Center 
report looks comprehensively at the “extreme vetting” idea by 
describing existing screening protocols as well as analyzing new 
ones the Trump administration has announced.20 On February 6, 
2018, President Trump established a “National Vetting Center” 
responsible for “coordinat[ing] agency vetting efforts to identify 
individuals who present a threat to national security, border 
security, homeland security, or public safety.”21 While the details 
of the center are less known, foreign nationals are already subject 
to extreme vetting procedures when applying for visa for admission 
to the United States.22 Similarly, “administrative processing” 
pre-dates the Trump administration and has long been used to 
hold visa applications following a visa interview at a consulate. 
Administrative processing is sometimes known as Security 
Advisory Opinion and is described in the following way in a fact 
sheet the Penn State Law Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic 
and the law firm of Maggio and Kattar produced: 
Administrative processing takes place after the visa interview. 
Before issuing a visa, consular officers review different 
databases to determine if information exists that may impact 
individual eligibility for a visa. A ‘hit’ on a particular database 
occurs when there is a match between the visa applicant and a 
database. These hits may be based on criminal convictions, 
security risks, and prior visa overstays or denials (this list is 
non-exhaustive). When an individual case has been tagged in a 
                                                                                                     
 20. See generally HARSHA PANDURANGA, FAIZA PATEL, & MICHAEL PRICE, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXTREME VETTING AND THE MUSLIM BAN (2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/extreme_vetting_f
ull_10.2_0.pdf (examining the Trump administration’s push for travel bans and 
extreme vetting as stereotypical and discriminatory). 
 21. Donald J. Trump, Presidential Memorandum On Optimizing the Use of 
Federal Government Information in Support of the National Vetting Enterprise, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/presidential-memorandum-optimizing-use-federal-government-information-
support-national-vetting-enterprise/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) 
(providing the grounds, including health, crime, security, need, and labor, which 
are considered in determining eligibility for visas or admission); Foreign Affairs 
Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., https://fam.state.gov/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) 
(noting the eligibility and ineligibility criteria for obtaining a visa) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
NATIONAL SECURITY, IMMIGRATION 1481 
database, the Department of State, at the request of the 
consular post, may initiate administrative processing.23  
These delays can go on for years and often without 
explanation. More recently, select nationals subject to 
administrative processing have stayed in this process or instead 
have been rolled into the Muslim Ban 3.0.24 
National security language has continued to guide the 
creation and defense of Executive Orders and related immigration 
policies issued in the Donald J. Trump administration. This Article 
builds on earlier scholarship examining the relationship between 
national security and immigration in the wake of September 11, 
2001, under the Obama administration, and during the campaign 
leading to the 2016 Election.25 While the Article is largely 
descriptive, it ultimately questions the longevity of using national 
security to create and defend immigration law. This Article is 
limited in scope—it does not provide a deep dive into the 
constitutionality of the Muslim bans, nor does it analyze the 
literature about the future of plenary power. There is a large body 
of scholarship and a treasure trove of litigation to address both 
questions.26  
                                                                                                     
 23. MAGGIO+KATTAR & THE PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING FAQS 1, https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/ 
default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/Administrative-Processing-FAQ.pdf (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 24. See id. at 2–3 (discussing administrative processing timelines and 
delays).  
 25. See generally, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law 
National Security Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669 (2017) (examining how recent national 
security concerns have shaped immigration policy and comparing those against 
policies enacted shortly after September 11, 2001); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Business As Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1485 (2010); Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1599 (2016) (noting unfairness in no-fly lists). 
 26. See generally Legal Challenges to Trump’s Entry Ban, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/category/cases-and-controversies/legal-challenges-to-
trumps-entry-ban/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (listing numerous articles 
providing analysis and coverage of the legal challenges to President Trump’s 
entry ban) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Documents in State 
of Hawaii et al v. Trump—A Challenge to President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Travel 
Ban, HOGAN LOVELLS (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.hoganlovells.com/en/ 
publications/documents-in-state-of-hawaii-et-al-v-trump-a-challenge-to-president-
trumps-march-6-2017-travel-ban (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing timelines 
and briefs filed in Hawaii v. Trump) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Immigration in the Time of Trump, PENN STATE L. CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ 
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Part II of this Article describes the first three Muslim bans the 
Executive Branch issued starting in January 2017.27 Part III 
explains the legal challenges to those bans brought in federal 
district and appellate courts around the country,28 and the 
government’s reliance on national security language to justify the 
bans. Part IV describes the human impact of the Muslim bans and 
some responses outside of the courtroom by organizations who 
represented the community and by the Penn State Law Center for 
Immigrants’ Rights Clinic (CIRC). I launched the CIRC in 2008 
which over the last decade has been engaged in providing legal 
support in individual immigration cases, community outreach and 
education and policy products for organizational clients.29 
                                                                                                     
RTS. CLINIC, https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/immigration-time-of-trump#Procs 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing web and other resources related to 
immigration specifically tailored for use in preparation for the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Gabriel. 
J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction 
for Our Strange but Exceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIG. 
L.J. 257 (2000) (analyzing the plenary power doctrine and its future); Kevin R. 
Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a 
Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (1999) (discussing the end of 
the plenary power doctrine); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary 
Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 
(1994) (analyzing the plenary power doctrine of the 1980s and providing a modern 
examination of the doctrine); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a 
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory 
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine 
as it relates to immigration law is in a slow decline); Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power 
Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307 (1999) (discussing the apology and prediction 
theses of plenary power). 
 27. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (restricting 
immigration and entrance into the U.S. from specified countries for a 90-day 
period); Exec. Order No. 13,870, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (rescinding 
and supplementing portions of Executive Order 13,769); Proclamation No. 9645, 
82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (adding countries to the restricted entry lists 
under Executive Orders 13,769 and 13,870). 
 28. See generally Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 
(4th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017); Washington v. 
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 
265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 
F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017). 
 29. See Penn State Law Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic Provides 
Outreach and Pro Bono Legal Support to Communities Across Pennsylvania, 
PENN ST. U., http://www.psu.edu/feature/2017/10/12/building-community-
through-compassion (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (describing the work of Penn 
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II. Muslim Bans 
For purposes of this Article, I use the term “Muslim ban” to 
describe policies by the Executive Branch that prohibit nationals 
from entering the United States. What to call the various bans the 
President has signed since January 27, 2017,30 has itself emerged 
as a question. Some prefer the term “travel ban” because it is more 
neutral. Others prefer the term “Muslim” ban or “Muslim/Refugee” 
ban because the restrictions imposed directly impact or block the 
admission of nationals from countries with majority Muslim 
populations or refugees. While I have used and continue to use 
“travel ban” when describing the contents of these bans to the 
general public or in written documents, I simultaneously believe 
the term is inaccurate. The bans the President signed do not 
merely restrict travel (e.g., a long weekend to Disneyworld) but in 
fact prevent the ability for people to enter the United States period. 
In my view, “Muslim ban” is an accurate description of the first 
three bans the President signed; two as executive orders and one 
as a presidential proclamation. In all three versions, the bulk of 
nations targeted have Muslim populations of more than 90%, and 
the bans have had devastating impacts on nationals from these 
countries.  
A. Muslim Ban 1.0 
The first ban was issued as an Executive Order signed at 
4:30 PM on January 27, 2017.31 The most controversial pieces of 
the ban suspended the entry of foreign nationals from seven 
countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and 
Syria — for a period of 90 days;32 suspended the United States’ 
                                                                                                     
State’s Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 30. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) 
(establishing the first iteration of the various bans); Exec. Order No. 13,870, 82 
Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (rescinding parts of and supplementing Executive 
Order 13,769); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) 
(adding countries to the restricted entry lists under Executive Orders 13,769 and 
13,870). 
 31. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 32. Id. at 8977–78. 
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refugee admissions program for a period of 120 days;33 slashed 
refugee numbers by one half from 110,000 to 55,000;34 and 
indefinitely suspended Syrian refugee admissions.35  
Importantly, refugees are already screened by multiple federal 
agencies and also interviewed by Department of Homeland 
Security officials before their admission into the United States. 
The government’s own website offers an infographic to describe the 
screening process for refugees.36 In addition to being interviewed 
by an officer of the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) for eligibility, the applicant’s background 
information is checked against several federal agency databases, 
followed by a cultural and medical check.37 The immigration 
statute defines “refugee” as a person who has suffered persecution 
or faces persecution in the future on account of their race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social 
group.38 The refugee definition, coupled with the security checks in 
place, underscores the rigor of the refugee admissions in the 
United States.39  
By its terms, the ban was effective immediately and, for this 
reason, caused chaos in airports around the country, confusion 
about the application of the ban to certain classes such as lawful 
permanent residents,40 and long nights and days for lawyers.41 
                                                                                                     
 33. Id. at 8979–80. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See The Refugee Processing and Screening System, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Jan. 
20, 2017), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/266459.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) 
(providing an easy-to-read graphic of the refugee processing and screening 
system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) 
(defining “refugee” under the INA). 
 39. See U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. DEP’T ST., 
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing 
a comprehensive overview of the refugee admissions program) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 40. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Statement by 
Secretary John Kelly on the Entry of Lawful Permanent Residents into the 
United States (Jan. 29, 2017) (clarifying the national interest in permitting lawful 
permanent residents to enter the country) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 41. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After 
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Said Sirine Shebaya, a civil rights attorney for Muslim Advocates 
who worked as an “airport lawyer” in the hours after the ban went 
into effect, “We were trying to both help family members there, 
draw attention to the chaos that was going on, and identify people 
who needed legal assistance.”42 Attorneys also provided 
on-the-ground support and education to impacted and interested 
community members in the hours and days following the ban.43 
The fallout of Muslim Ban 1.0 was not limited to the immediate 
chaos, but also extended to the later discovery that the White 
House had not consulted with its own attorneys before issuing the 
ban.44 
B. Muslim Ban 2.0 
With the rescission of the first ban came the second, also in 
the form of an Executive Order President Donald Trump signed on 
March 6, 2017.45 This Executive Order suspended the entry of 
                                                                                                     
Trump’s Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/ 
us/lawyers-trump-muslim-ban-immigration.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) 
(noting that lawyers volunteered immediately to assist refugees entering the 
country by meeting them at airports) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Lucy Westcott, Thousands of Lawyers Descend on U.S. Airports to Fight 
Trump’s Immigrant Ban, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.newsweek. 
com/lawyers-volunteer-us-airports-trump-ban-549830 (last visited Sept. 18, 
2018) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. Esther Yu Hsi Lee, The Week the Country United Against Trump’s 
Xenophobia, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 27, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/muslim-
ban-one-year-anniversary-ce90b97d04da/?utm_source=NSHR+Rapid+Response&ut 
m_campaign=2544c7dc3f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_19&utm_medium=email 
&utm_term=0_3a915757be-2544c7dc3f-391821061 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43. See, e.g., Abed Ayoub & Khaled Beydoun, Executive Disorder: The 
Muslim Ban, Emergency Advocacy, and the Fires Next Time, 22 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 215, 228–33 (2017) (examining the efforts of individuals responding to 
President Trump’s Muslim Ban immediately after enactment). 
 44. See Evan Perez, Pamela Brown, & Kevin Liptak, Inside the Confusion of 
the Trump Executive Order and Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“Administration officials weren't immediately sure which 
countries' citizens would be barred from entering the United States. The 
Department of Homeland Security was left making a legal analysis on the order 
after Trump signed it.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. See Exec. Order No. 13,870, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) 
(implementing revisions to the first Muslim Ban executive order). 
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foreign nationals from six countries—Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, 
Yemen, and Syria—for a period of 90 days;46 froze the refugee 
admissions program for a period of 120 days;47 and slashed the 
refugee numbers by one half.48 There are at least three differences 
between the first and second ban: in the second, the indefinite ban 
on Syrians was dropped, the ban on Iraqi entrants was dropped, 
and the effective date of the order was delayed for ten days. This 
Executive Order also spelled out the exemptions with more clarity, 
presumably because of the confusion generated in the aftermath of 
the first ban. The exemptions listed in the second Executive Order 
included: lawful permanent residents (green card holders); those 
paroled or admitted into the United States; those permitted to 
travel; dual nationals of a country traveling on a diplomatic visa; 
and those granted refugee-related relief.49 Muslim Ban 2.0 also 
introduced a new waiver scheme for those the ban covered, but who 
can demonstrate that: (1) denying entry would cause the foreign 
national undue hardship; (2) entry would not pose a threat to the 
national security or public safety of the United States; and 
(3) entry would be in the national interest.50 The terms “undue 
hardship” “national security” and “national interest” were not 
defined in the Executive Order nor are they defined specifically in 
the immigration statute or regulations.51 The text of the Executive 
Order listed ten examples of who might qualify for a waiver but 
indicated that such waivers would be granted only on a case by 
case basis.52 Some of these examples include foreign nationals with 
significant work, study or other ties to the United States, those 
seeking to enter the United States for business or professional 
obligations, and those seeking to enter and reside with a close 
                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 13,201. 
 47. Id. at 13,210.  
 48. Id. at 13,216. 
 49. Id. at 13,213–14. 
 50. Id. at 13,214–15. 
 51. See id. § 3. See also SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, PENN ST. L. CTR. FOR 
IMMIGRANTS’ RTS., UNTANGLING THE WAIVER SCHEME IN PROTECTING THE NATION 
FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES 1–3 (2017), 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/WaiverDocFinal%203.28.17.pdf 
(discussing President Trump’s second Muslim Ban executive order’s waiver 
scheme). 
 52. Exec. Order No. 13,870, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).  
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family member in the United States.53 On the same day the ban 
was issued, lawyers and advocates rejected the ban and called it a 
rebranded version of the first.54 
C. Muslim Ban 3.0 
A third version of the Muslim Ban was issued as a Presidential 
Proclamation on September 24, 2017.55 A proclamation is similar 
but not identical to an Executive Order in form.56 The proclamation 
indefinitely blocks the entry for certain individuals from eight 
countries: Iran, Libya, Chad, North Korea, Syria, Somalia, 
Venezuela, and Yemen.57 These countries were ostensibly chosen 
based on the perceived threat these countries posed.58 Sudan, 
which had been listed as a banned country in the prior two Muslim 
bans, was dropped from the list of banned countries in this third 
version. The restrictions placed on nationals from the eight 
countries in the third version are indefinite in duration. Like its 
predecessor, Muslim Ban 3.0 includes exemptions for lawful 
permanent residents, refugees, those granted asylum, and dual 
nationals, among others.59 The ban also lists a waiver scheme and 
examples similar to the language of the second version. The 
                                                                                                     
 53. Id. § 3(c). 
 54. See AM.’S VOICE EDUC. FUND, TRUMP’S “REVISED” REFUGEE AND MUSLIM 
BAN IS STILL A REFUGEE AND MUSLIM BAN 1–2 (2017), 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/AVEF%20Press%20Release%20o
n%20Immigration%20EO.pdf (explaining that the President Trump’s second 
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 55. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017) (adding countries 
to the restricted entry lists under Executive Orders 13,769 and 13,870). 
 56. See PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC, PRESIDENTIAL 
PROCLAMATIONS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (2017), https://pennstatelaw. 
psu.edu/sites/default/files/Proclamations%20Memo%20Final.pdf (comparing and 
contrasting presidential proclamations and executive orders). 
 57. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,163 (2017). 
 58. Id. § 1(h)(ii) (“[A]lthough immigrants generally receive more extensive 
vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is less reliable when the country from 
which someone seeks to emigrate . . . presents risks to the national security of the 
United States.”). 
 59. Id. § 3(b) (providing a list of exceptions to restricted entry into the United 
States). 
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government provided no guidance about how the waiver will be 
adjudicated, how often and by whom.60  
III. Legal Challenges to the Bans 
Each version of the ban was challenged in federal courts 
around the country and by a variety of litigants that included 
mosques,61 individual family members,62 states,63 and refugee 
resettlement organizations,64 among others. A flurry of amicus 
(friend of the court) briefs accompanied the first three Muslim 
bans, and came from a wide range of interested parties who 
include, but are not limited to, constitutional scholars, 
immigration law professors, former national security officials, 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Supreme Court Issues Orders on Ban 3.0: 
What You Need to Know, FACEBOOK (Dec. 12, 2017), https:// 
www.facebook.com/shoba.wadhia/videos/10211368742116442/?pnref=story (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (examining recent judicial orders concerning President 
Trump’s Muslim Ban executive orders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).   
 61. See Associated Press, Travel Ban Challenge Puts Hawaii’s Few Muslims 
in Spotlight, VOA (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/travel-ban-
challenge-puts-hawaiis-few-muslims-in-spotlight/3761158.html (Mar. 10, 2017) 
(“Hawaii has 5,000 or so Muslims – less than 1 percent of the state’s 
population – who are finding themselves thrust into an international spotlight 
after the state’s top lawyer launched a challenge to President Donald Trump’s 
revised travel ban . . . .”) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 62. See generally, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 
(4th Cir. 2018) (providing an example of a lawsuit brought on behalf of individuals 
by family members of refugees); see also Muslim Ban Litigation, BRENNAN CTR. 
(Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/muslim-ban-litigation-
case-page (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing a summary background and 
explanation of Zakzok) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 63. See, e.g., Pete Williams, 15 States Join Hawaii’s Challenge to Travel Ban 
Enforcement, NBC NEWS (Jul. 10, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/15-states-join-hawaii-s-challenge-travel-ban-enforcement-n781466 (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (examining the states which decided to file lawsuits 
challenging President Trump’s travel ban executive orders) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 64. See generally, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 
(4th Cir. 2017) (providing an example of a case brought by resettlement 
organizations and other such groups). 
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organizations who represent Muslim, Arab and South Asian 
communities, and organizations who support the bans.65 
The government advanced several arguments in defense of the 
bans. As a preliminary argument, the government argued that the 
courts have no right to review the terms of the ban. Citing to 
Kleindienst v. Mandel,66 the government argued, “‘when the 
Executive exercises’ immigration authority ‘on the basis of a 
facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look 
behind the exercise of that discretion.’”67 The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals disagreed, concluding early on, “Although our 
jurisprudence has long counseled deference to the political 
branches on matters of immigration and national security, neither 
the Supreme Court nor our court has ever held that courts lack the 
authority to review executive action in those arenas for compliance 
with the Constitution.”68 The government also identified section 
1182(f) as a source of authority for excluding nationals from 
countries. Section 1182(f) states in part:   
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of 
any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental 
to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, 
and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the 
entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or 
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions 
he may deem to be appropriate.69 
With respect to Muslim Ban 1.0, attorneys began reviewing 
possible legal claims for challenging Muslim Ban 1.0 and filed 
documents in federal court seeking relief for individuals on an 
expedited basis.70 One week after the first ban was announced, a 
                                                                                                     
 65. For a listing of these briefs, see A Rough Guide to Amicus Briefs in the 
Travel Ban Cases, infra note 73 (providing a list of organizations which filed 
amicus briefs in travel ban litigation). 
 66. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 67. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 68. Id. 
 69. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012). 
 70. For a listing of the nearly fifty legal challenges filed against Muslim Ban 
1.0 in federal courts, see Special Collection: Civil Rights Challenges to Trump 
Refugee/Visa Orders, U. MICH. L. SCH.’S C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?%20searchSpecialCollection=44 (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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federal court judge from Seattle issued a nationwide injunction 
that prevented the most controversial sections of the ban from 
going into effect.71 Eventually, and presumably in reaction to a 
heap of lawsuits filed around the country challenging its terms, the 
ban was rescinded.72 
While the litigation surrounding the first ban diminished with 
the introduction of the second, lawsuits challenging the second and 
third versions of the ban ensued over several months.73 The two 
most important cases dealing with the Muslim Ban 2.0 originated 
in the Hawaii and Maryland courts.74 Both courts issued 
injunctions blocking the most controversial portions of the ban and 
both injunctions were then appealed to the circuit courts of 
appeals.75 The Government also asked the Supreme Court to 
continue these bans and also hear arguments by filing a petition 
for certiorari.76 On June 26, 2017 the Supreme Court granted a 
partial stay (let a portion of Muslim Ban 2.0 go into effect) and also 
granted certiorari in Muslim Ban 2.0.77 The June 26, 2017 decision 
opened with a history of the travel ban and the constitutional and 
statutory arguments made before the federal courts. The 
                                                                                                     
 71. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1164–67, 1168–1169 (finding that 
the federal government did not show a likelihood of success on the issue of due 
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 72. See Drew C. McCarthy, On Travel Order, Trump Will Rescind and 
Replace, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.national 
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the-travel-ban-cases (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the many amicus briefs 
filed in cases instituted in the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74. See generally Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 75. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 701; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 
F.3d at 604. 
 76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 
2017) (No. 17-17168); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1351). 
 77. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 
(2017) (“Accordingly, the petitions for certiorari are granted, and the stay 
applications are granted in part.”). 
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prevailing constitutional argument raised was that the travel ban 
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.78 The 
primary statutory argument surrounded whether the travel ban 
violates a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that 
prohibits discrimination with regard to the issuance of immigrant 
visas.79 Section 1152(a) of the Act states in part, “[N]o person shall 
receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in 
the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, 
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”80 
In allowing a part of Muslim Ban 2.0 to go into effect, the 
Supreme Court determined that individuals from the six countries 
(all of which have Muslim populations of more than 90%) and all 
refugees can be blocked from entering the United States if they 
lack a “bona fide” relationship to a person or organization.81 The 
bona fide test was an invention of the Supreme Court and included 
the following examples of what might constitute a “bona fide” 
relationship: 
For individuals, a close familial relationship is required. A 
foreign national who wishes to enter the United States to live 
with or visit a family member, like Doe’s wife or Dr. Elshikh’s 
mother-in-law, clearly has such a relationship. As for entities, 
the relationship must be formal, documented, and formed in the 
ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading EO–2. 
The students from the designated countries who have been 
admitted to the University of Hawaii have such a relationship 
with an American entity. So too would a worker who accepted 
an offer of employment from an American company or a lecturer 
invited to address an American audience.82 
These examples did not resolve the confusion this decision 
promised to cause to impacted individuals, employers, agencies, 
consulates and other officials responsible for determining the term 
“bona fide.” Even the dissent, arguing that the stay should have 
been granted in its entirety, opined, “I fear that the Court’s remedy 
                                                                                                     
 78. See id. at 2084–86 (discussing the constitutional challenges in the lower 
courts). 
 79. See id. (discussing the challenges to President Trump’s executive orders 
for violating provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
 80. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 81. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. at 2088–89 
(analyzing the Government’s request for a stay of injunction). 
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will prove unworkable. Today’s compromise will burden executive 
officials with the task of deciding—on peril of contempt—whether 
individuals from the six affected nations who wish to enter the 
United States have a sufficient connection to a person or entity in 
this country.”83 
In its June 2017 opinion, the Supreme Court also overstated 
the significance of the travel ban’s “waiver scheme” when it 
reasoned, “Indeed, EO–2 itself distinguishes between foreign 
nationals who have some connection to this country, and foreign 
nationals who do not, by establishing a case-by-case waiver system 
primarily for the benefit of individuals in the former category.”84 
However, the waivers are more cumbersome than meets the eye 
and only delay admission. The Supreme Court implemented the 
order within seventy-two hours of the ruling.85 Hours before the 
ban was to go into effect, the government issued guidance narrowly 
defining what constitutes a “bona fide relationship:” “A ‘close 
family’ relationship includes: a parent (including parent-in-law), 
spouse, child, adult son or daughter, fiancé(e), son-in-law, 
daughter-in-law, and sibling, whether whole or half. This includes 
step relationships. However, ‘close family’ does not include 
grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, 
cousins, brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law and any other 
‘extended’ family members.”86  
The exclusion of grandparents and others from the bona fide 
test struck a chord in the courts. Litigation about the meaning of 
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 85. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017) 
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a “bona fide relationship” ensued in the Hawaii District Court and 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.87 On July 13, 2017, the Hawaii 
District Court rejected the government’s narrow definition of bona 
fide relationship and ruled that grandparents and other family 
members cannot be excluded.88 Said the Hawaii court: 
In sum, the Government’s definition of close familial 
relationship is not only not compelled by the Supreme Court’s 
June 26 decision, but contradicts it. Equally problematic, the 
Government’s definition represents the antithesis of common 
sense. Common sense, for instance, dictates that close family 
members be defined to include grandparents. Indeed, 
grandparents are the epitome of close family members. The 
Government’s definition excludes them. That simply cannot 
be.89 
Among the jurisprudence the Supreme Court and the litigants 
referenced was the well-known case of Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland.90 There, the Supreme Court held: 
[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely 
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family that we 
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, 
moral and cultural. Ours is by no means a tradition limited to 
respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. 
The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially 
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and 
children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of 
constitutional recognition.91  
While the July 13 ruling by the Hawaii court was a win for 
grandparents and common sense, the government’s 
(mis)understanding of family looms. Law aside, the debate around 
“bona fide relationship” raises fundamental questions about 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Hawaii v. Trump, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1054–62 (D. Haw. 2017) 
(addressing Plaintiffs’ challenge to the government’s interpretation of “bona fide 
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culture, identity, and family. Many define family in ways that go 
beyond the nuclear one. Banning or restricting a grandparent or 
aunt based on the absence of a “bona fide” relationship undermines 
not only the jurisprudence around family but also the experiences 
of first and second-generation immigrants living in the United 
States. The sting of excluding family members like grandparents, 
grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins also sends 
the message that such relationships are sham or unreal. But what 
is truly unreal is the government’s narrow grasp of family. 
Courtroom traffic proceeded over the scope of “bona fide” 
relationship. On July 18, 2017, the Department of State issued an 
announcement defining “close familial relationship” more 
expansively.92 Meanwhile, the government filed papers in the 
Supreme Court asking it to intervene again.93 The Supreme Court 
scheduled oral arguments in connection with the second ban for 
October 10, 2017, but these arguments were cancelled. Said the 
Court, “[b]ecause that provision of the Order ‘expired by its own 
terms’ on September 24, 2017, the appeal no longer presents a ‘live 
case or controversy.’”94 
Muslim Ban 3.0 was subject to legal actions in the federal 
district courts of Hawaii and Maryland.95 Like litigation 
                                                                                                     
 92. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Muslim Ban Litigation: An Unfinished 
Symphony, ACSBLOG (July 20, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/muslim-
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 94. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353, 353 (2017). 
 95. For a listing of ongoing cases challenging the September 24, 2017, 
executive order, see Litigation Documents & Resources Related to Trump 
Executive Order on Immigration, LAWFARE, https://lawfareblog.com/litigation-
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surrounding earlier versions of the bans, plaintiffs argued that 
Muslim Ban 3.0 is in violation of the immigration statute and also 
the United States Constitution.96 The statutory arguments are 
arguably stronger with regard to Muslim Ban 3.0 because of its 
terms: the text indefinitely blocks the entry of all immigrants from 
seven countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, 
and Yemen along with additional restrictions.97 By contrast, the 
INA was amended in 1965 to eliminate the national origin and 
nationality quotas and also included this new provision: “no person 
shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against 
in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, 
sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”98 In October 
2017, the Hawaii and Maryland courts blocked the wholesale 
suspension of nationals in Muslim Ban 3.0 on statutory grounds, 
constitutional grounds or both.99 Once again, the Government 
appealed the decisions to the appellate courts and furthermore 
asked the United States Supreme Court to place a hold on the court 
decisions pending a final disposition on appeal or at the Supreme 
Court.100  
The Supreme Court granted the Government’s wish and, on 
December 4, 2017, allowed the full version of Muslim Ban 3.0 to go 
into effect pending a decision by the appellate courts and 
disposition of the Government’s petition for certiorari before the 
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Supreme Court.101 The decision was remarkable to the extent that 
a broad ban was reinstated in full without a ruling by the appellate 
courts and without specific guidance by the implementing agencies 
about how the ban would apply in practice. Within twenty-four 
hours of the December 4, 2017 decision, I started to receive calls 
from students and scholars from an affected country about their 
future, such as their ability to leave the United States and return 
or the ability for a loved one to obtain a visitor visa to come visit 
family in the United States. The timing of the Supreme Court’s 
decision was surprising both procedurally and practically. 
Procedurally, reinstating the ban on the Monday before the 
appellate courts were scheduled to hear oral arguments on appeal 
about the legality of the ban complicated a process that ordinarily 
might start at a lower court, be raised at a higher court, and then 
only considered by the Supreme Court. Practically, December is a 
month during which students from around the world graduate 
from university and when family members apply for visas or 
schedule travel to depart or enter the United States to reunite with 
family during the holidays. As a professor situated on a college 
campus with one of the largest international student populations 
and graduate studies programs, which had a fall semester 
graduation date in the same month, my heart simply sank. 
On December 6, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
heard oral arguments from the plaintiffs and government in the 
Muslim Ban 3.0 case.102 The arguments focused largely on the 
immigration statute, with an exchange between the judges and 
counsel for the Plaintiffs about the scope and limitations of 
statutory sections that pertain to nondiscrimination in the 
issuance of immigrant visas103 and the authority by the President 
                                                                                                     
 101. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Ban 3.0 at the Supreme Court: What You 
Need to Know, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2017), https://medium.com/@shobawadhia/ 
supreme-court-issues-orders-on-ban-3-0-what-this-means-db7c8e83c04c (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (explaining the relevant Muslim Ban cases, their results 
in the courts, and who the results affected) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 102. See Hawaii v. Trump Oral Argument, C-SPAN (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?437732-1/ninth-circuit-hears-oral-argument-presidents-
travel-ban (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing a video recording of oral 
arguments in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hawaii v. Trump) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 103. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (addressing a policy of nondiscrimination in the 
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to suspend the entry of noncitizens when such entry is 
“detrimental to the interests” of the United States.104 On December 
8, 2017, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments 
on Muslim Ban 3.0, and in this round focused largely on the 
constitutional questions, namely whether barring certain citizens 
from six majority Muslim countries, plus North Korea and 
Venezuela, violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.105  
On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
issued a decision that extended the Muslim Ban for nationals who 
lack a bona fide relationship to a person or entity.106 Relying on the 
statutory arguments, the court concluded “[t]he Proclamation, like 
its predecessor executive orders, relies on the premise that the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., vests the President with broad powers 
to regulate the entry of aliens. Those powers, however, are not 
without limit. We conclude that the President’s issuance of the 
Proclamation once again exceeds the scope of his delegated 
authority.”107 Once again, the Ninth Circuit focused its conclusion 
on the statute, finding that the Proclamation conflicts with the 
nondiscrimination clause of the INA and furthermore fails to make 
a finding that blocking nationals from the six Muslim majority 
countries is “detrimental to the interest of the United States” as 
Section 212(f) of the INA requires.108 
On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
issued a 285-page decision that was split among the judges.109 The 
majority opinion focused on the likelihood that plaintiffs would 
prevail on constitutional grounds and concluded that that the 
Proclamation is “unconstitutionally tainted with animus toward 
                                                                                                     
issuance of immigrant visas). 
 104. See id. § 1182(f) (authorizing the President to prohibit and restrict 
certain classes of aliens, immigrants, or nonimmigrants from entering the U.S.). 
 105. See Listen to Oral Arguments, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIR., 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2018) (providing audio recordings of arguments in the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 106. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 107. Id. at 673.   
 108. Id. at 673, 692–94. 
 109. See generally Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 
(4th Cir. 2018). 
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Islam.”110 The court’s conclusion did not rest on statements made 
by the President before the election but rather on his subsequent 
statements against Muslims. Said the court: 
We need not [rely on pre-election statements] . . . because the 
President’s inauguration did not herald a new day. Rather, only 
a week after taking office, President Trump issued EO-1, which 
banned the entry of citizens of six Muslim majority countries, 
provided exemptions for Christians, and lacked any asserted 
evidence indicating a genuine national security purpose. The 
very next day, January 28, 2017, Rudy Giuliani, an advisor to 
President Trump, explained that EO-1’s purpose was to 
discriminate against Muslims.111  
Prior to the decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
the administration filed a petition with the United States Supreme 
Court asking it to hear the case.112 On January 19, 2018, 
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Trump v. Hawaii, and 
determine the legality of the ban.113 The Supreme Court asked the 
parties to answer the following four questions: (1) whether the 
challenge to EO-3 is justiciable;114 (2) whether EO-3 is a lawful 
exercise of executive authority; (3) whether the global injunction 
against EO-3 the Hawaii District Court entered and affirmed in 
pertinent part by the Ninth Circuit is overbroad; and (4) whether 
EO-3 violates the Establishment Clause.115 Several amicus briefs 
were filed to the Supreme Court including but not limited to one 
the author co-counseled. The amicus brief states, in part:  
The third iteration of President Trump’s travel ban (EO-3) 
dramatically exceeds the Executive’s authority under the 
                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 257. 
 111. Id. at 266. 
 112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) 
(No. 17-965).  
 113. Grant of Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (No. 
17-965).  
 114. For a comprehensive piece on judicial review and the travel bans, see 
generally Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review of 
Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1. 
 115. See Grant of Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) 
(No. 17-965) (indicating which issues the Court wants discussed in the parties’ 
briefings). For the list of questions referred to in this Grant of Writ of Certiorari, 
see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) 
(No. 17-965) (presenting the issues on appeal).  
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It is irreconcilable with 
the INA’s comprehensive framework and with past practice 
under the statute. When Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) in 
1952, it delegated to the President a cabined authority to enact 
restrictions on immigration in response to exigent geopolitical 
circumstances. It delegated this authority against a backdrop of 
temporary, wartime grants, which the President was to use only 
to restrict entry from hostile sovereign states and foreign 
subversive groups. Congress was fully aware of this backdrop 
when it passed § 1182(f). It did not intend to expand the 
President’s peacetime powers beyond what his wartime 
authority had been.116 
On April 25, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
Trump v. Hawaii. During oral arguments, Solicitor General Noel 
Francisco argued that the suspension clause or 212(f) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act gives the President authority to 
add additional restrictions than what is outlined in the INA. On 
behalf of Hawaii, Neal Katyal argued that the proclamation is 
unlawful for three reasons: (1) it interferes with congressional 
policy, (2) it conflicts with the nondiscrimination clause at Section 
202(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and (3) it violates 
the First Amendment.117 On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court 
issued a 5–4 decision upholding Muslim Ban 3.0. Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote the opinion and concluded that the proclamation 
falls within the scope of Section 212(f) and further does not conflict 
with the nondiscrimination clause at Section 202(a).118 Justice 
Breyer’s dissent focused on the broken nature of the waiver scheme 
in the proclamation and the position that the waiver process 
amounts to “window dressing.”119 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Brief for Scholars of Immigration Law in Support of Immigration 
Law in Support of Respondents on the History of the Immigration and Nationality 
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 117. Transcripts of Oral Argument at 38–39, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965). For an analysis of the oral argument, see Shoba 
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ACSBLOG (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/meditation-on-oral-
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 118. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408–10 (2018) (addressing the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the proclamation exceeded the President’s authority). 
 119. Id. at 2432–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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focused on the series of statements made by President Trump 
against Muslims and the conclusion that proclamation is driven by 
animus and in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.120  
IV. Outside the Courtroom 
The human impact of the Muslim Bans is more than 
theoretical. The chaos at airports during the weekend of Muslim 
Ban 1.0 was tied to the scores of individuals who were unable to 
board planes to fly to the United States or unable to be admitted 
after arrival because of their nationality. The press, immigration 
attorneys and the policy groups documented these stories.121 One 
publicized case involved Suha Abushamma, a Saudi in the first 
year of an Internal Medicine residency program at Cleveland 
Clinic. As ProPublica reported, Abushamma was born and raised 
in Saudi Arabia and holds a passport from Sudan, which blocked 
her admission to the United States. Said Abushamma, “I’m only in 
                                                                                                     
 120. See id at 2438–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Taking all the relevant 
evidence together, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation 
was driven primarily by anti-Muslim animus . . . .”). For an analysis of the 
opinion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Symposium: Reflections on the travel ban 
decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/ 
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(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 121. See Charles Ornstein, Hours After Landing in U.S., Cleveland Clinic 
Doctor Forced to Leave by Trump’s Order, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 29, 2017),  
https://www.propublica.org/article/cleveland-clinic-doctor-forced-to-leave-country-
after-trump-order (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (covering the story of a doctor 
forced to return to Saudi Arabia in the confusion of President Trump’s executive 
order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sam Fulwood III, The 
Real Effect of Trump’s Muslim Ban, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2017/02/09/414802/the-real-
effect-of-trumps-muslim-ban/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (same) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Lyric Lewin, These are the Faces of Trump’s 
Ban, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/01/politics/immigration-ban-
stories/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (showing photos and telling short stories of 
the people President Trump’s executive orders have affected) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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this country to be a doctor, to work and to help 
people— that’s it . . . .”122  
With Muslim Ban 3.0 in full effect as of this writing, all 
immigrants and certain nonimmigrants from five Muslim-majority 
countries the ban targets are blocked from entering the United 
States, regardless of whether they are in a qualifying relationship 
with a family member or employer or if they are seeking to visit a 
loved one as a visitor or tourist. I have personally witnessed the 
separation of spouses from one continent to another and the 
inability of a parent to visit a child who is a university student. 
The feeling is heartbreaking. What is equally heartbreaking is the 
broken nature of the waiver scheme first introduced in Muslim 
Ban 2.0 and operational with the latest version 3.0. Several 
applicants the Ban covers have been denied a visa by consulates 
around the world with or without consideration of a waiver.123 The 
waiver debacle has resulted in situation where consulates are 
failing to consider evidence the applicant presents.124 To illustrate 
the case of a Yemeni family in Djibouti separated from their family 
in the United States:  
A is a civil engineer and a United States Citizen who petitioned 
for a visa for his wife, mother and children, ages 13, 9, and 5 
years old, who are all Yemeni citizens. He accompanied them to 
their interview at the Djibouti embassy in December 2017, at 
the conclusion of which they were told everything was complete 
and were even provided a document from the consular officer 
that told them their visa had been approved, and that it was 
awaiting printing. On December 14, however, A received a 
second notice informing him that his family’s visas were all 
denied and were furthermore considered ineligible for a waiver 
under the Proclamation. He had not been contacted and had 
asked for any additional information in between the two notices. 
A has reached out to his congressional representatives, who — in 
turn—have inquired with the congressional liaisons on his 
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 123. See Yeganeh Torbati & Mica Rosenberg, Exclusive: Visa Waivers Rarely 
Granted Under Trump’s Latest U.S. Travel Ban—Data, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2018), 
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behalf, seeking information as to why his wife and daughters 
were denied a waiver. They were not provided with any reasons, 
and were only told that the decision was final. A’s family 
remains in Djibouti, unable to secure all the visas to Egypt and 
afraid to return to Yemen, where he reports airstrikes have hit 
approximately a thousand meters from their home.125  
Resistance to the Muslim Bans outside of the courtroom has 
also been significant, as community leaders, lawyers, law school 
clinics, college and university presidents, affected individuals, 
media outlets, and the court of public opinion played a tremendous 
role in pushing back against the bans.126 For one example, 
advocates working on behalf of the Yemeni community played a 
central role in revealing the scores of individuals denied a visa, 
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Another Travel Ban In the U.S. is Igniting a Backlash, CNBC (Jul. 6, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/06/another-travel-ban-in-the-us-is-igniting-a-
backlash.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (examining state response and efforts 
combatting President Trump’s executive orders and against other states that 
have passed laws discriminating against certain groups of citizens) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); USA Today College Staff, How Universities 
Are Responding to Trump’s Travel Ban, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2017), 
http://college.usatoday.com/2017/01/29/how-universities-are-responding-to-
trumps-travel-ban/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“The 62 institutions comprising 
the Association of American Universities (AAU), released a statement . . . urging 
government officials to end the travel ban ‘as quickly as possible.’”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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often without consideration of a waiver in the early days Muslim 
Ban 3.0 was in effect and beyond.127  
Further, advocates representing Muslim, Arab, and South 
Asian (MASA) communities created a web platform with one 
purpose: to “[c]enter communities directly affected by the Muslim 
and refugee bans, namely Muslims, refugees, and nationals from 
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.”128 Deepa Iyer is 
one of the coordinators for “nomuslimbanever.com” and MASA 
Organizing, a rapid response and field coordination space that 
emerged in the wake of the November 2016 election. Iyer told me,  
The online hub provides an opportunity for organizations and 
individuals to quickly locate direct actions, rallies, and 
solidarity events as well as find resources about the Muslim ban 
litigation. The website seeks to be a one-stop clearinghouse of 
information for anyone interested in becoming engaged with 
events and actions related to resisting the Muslim ban.129 
Public education about the bans also surged. In response to 
the bans, law school clinics and organizations representing 
impacted communities also held community forums to explain 
what the bans actually say and take questions from individuals.130 
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Wasn’t., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/ 
nyregion/immigrants-visa-yemen.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“After the 
third version of the Trump administration’s travel ban took effect on Dec. 8, 
[Yemeni citizens’] approvals abruptly turned to rejections, in what lawyers, 
family members and immigration activists said was a display of bad faith.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); The Yemeni American Justice 
Initiative (YAJI), CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://ccrjustice.org/YAJI 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“The obstacles the Yemeni-American communities 
face are manifold and complex, thus the approach taken by YAJI is similarly 
multifaceted, combining legal tools with non-legal advocacy such as creating 
resources, community outreach, and fact-finding projects.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 128. About the Campaign, NO MUSLIM BAN EVER, https://www.nomuslimban 
ever.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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RTS. CLINIC (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/PennState 
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Refugee and Muslim Ban, YALE L. SCH. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/yls-
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As part of one of the most impacted universities,131 I delivered 
numerous information sessions and town halls on the Muslim bans 
and fielded hundreds of questions from individuals in my 
individual capacity or as part of the immigration clinic at Penn 
State Law. The questions focused largely on the details of the bans 
and how they impact travel and the future.132 Together or separate 
from the clinic, key organizations like the American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee,133 Arab American Institute,134 
Bridges Initiative,135 Muslim Advocates,136 and National 
Immigration Law Center137 organized conference calls, convened 
public forums, and developed written fact sheets or updates about 
the Muslim bans.138 
                                                                                                     
today/news/challenging-refugee-and-muslim-ban (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) 
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(noting the high number of individuals the immigration ban affected at Penn 
State University) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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 137. NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR, https://www.nilc.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) 
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One year following Muslim Ban 1.0, on January 27, 2018, 
hundreds gathered in Washington D.C. to mark the anniversary.139 
Said Congresswoman Judy Chu, Chair of the Congressional Asian 
Pacific American Caucus, in a joint statement:  
One year ago, President Trump enacted the first iteration of his 
discriminatory Muslim travel ban in order to fulfill a campaign 
promise rooted in hatred and xenophobia. This policy will 
always be remembered for its blatant bigotry and the chaos it 
caused in our nation’s airports on the day it was hastily 
unveiled. But it will also be remembered as a day when 
thousands of Americans across the country came together to 
denounce hate.140  
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Said the national organization South Asian Americans 
Leading Together:  
No one should fear for their safety because of their country of 
origin, how they pray, speak, or dress. Yet that is exactly what 
this administration attempted to accomplish one year ago today 
when it signed into the law its first Muslim Ban. Over the year, 
through a combination of hateful rhetoric, toxic tweets, and 
polluted policies, including four iterations of the Muslim Ban, 
this administration has made every effort to institutionalize 
Islamophobia.141  
Resistance and public education outside the courtroom serve 
as an important reminder that whatever may happen in the courts, 
there has been success in how groups and communities have been 
responding. Those involved will not forget the thousands of 
lawyers who descended to the airports the night of the first ban or 
the scores of advocates who have and continue to inform and 
educate the communities about the various iterations of the bans 
and best practices for moving forward, especially for—but not 
limited to—those who the ban covers and are seeking a waiver.  
V. Conclusion 
For more than two centuries, national security has been used 
to justify immigration laws that exclude people based on race and 
related factors. Even in cases where the courts or a future 
administration have struck down these laws or found no connection 
between matters of national security and the basis for exclusion, 
there has been little to no government accountability. As I reflect on 
the profound human impact, prolonged courtroom sessions and 
resistance to the Muslim bans, my hope is that the government is 
held accountable with restitution to those impacted and a stronger 
country.  
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